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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of distribution networks in explaining incumbency
advantages in the European car market. We compare three approaches to incorporate
the size of distribution networks in discrete choice models of product di¤erentiation:
as an extra product characteristic, as a new dimension of product di¤erentiation in
a nested logit framework, or as a measure of the expected travel cost under a spa-
tial Poisson distribution of locations. We obtain robust conclusions across all three
approaches: distribution networks play an important role in explaining car produc-
ersmarket shares, but they only appear to explain part of the bias towards domestic
brands in the car market. We also report on an ongoing research project where we
analyze the role of distribution networks at a much more detailed local market level,
and investigate the specic role of exclusive dealing as a possible entry barrier.
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1 Introduction
Car manufacturers across the world make use of a variety of vertical restraints to organize
their dealer networks. In European countries two forms of exclusivity are common. Terri-
torial exclusivity provides dealers the right to sell a certain brand in a designated territory
without competition from other dealers selling the same brand. Brand exclusivity, usually
referred to as exclusive dealing, provides manufacturers the right to mandate their dealers
not to sell competing brands within the same outlet. Theoretical work has stressed that
incumbents may use this second form of exclusivity to foreclose new entry. When dealers
cannot sell other brands, new entrants are forced to set up their own costly distribution
networks; see for example, Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Segal and Whinston (2000). In
ongoing work we empirically analyse the incentives of incumbent car producers to foreclose
entry through exclusive dealing. We take into account that new entrants may compensate
the incumbents and their dealers for not signing exclusive dealing contracts (Nurski and
Verboven, 2013). This work is based on a rich dataset on demand and dealer locations at
the level of local markets in one country (Belgium).
In the present paper we address a preliminary question using more aggregate data for a
panel of nine European countries during 2000-2009. We ask to what extent the size of car
producersdistribution networks contributes to explaining the car producersmarket shares.
We nd that the distribution networks play an important role, although they only appear to
explain part of the bias for domestic brands as observed in countries with local car producers.
Analyzing the role of distribution networks on demand is of broader interest to understand
the mechanisms behind incumbency advantages emphasized in industrial organization, and
behind market entry or penetration costs recently emphasized in international trade.1 We
therefore rst present three possible approaches on how one may incorporate distribution
networks in discrete choice models of product di¤erentiation. We then present the data
and empirical results. Finally, we conclude and report on an ongoing research project that
aims to investigate the subsequent question whether exclusive dealing acts as a specic entry
barrier in the car industry.
1Geroski (1995) discusses the stylized fact that even successful new entrants require a considerable amount
of time to reach market shares comparable to incumbents. Berger and Dick (2007) and Bronnenberg et
al. (2009) provide recent analyses of early mover advantages and the persistence of market shares. In
international trade, Das et al. (2007) provide an empirical analysis of market entry costs, and Arkolakis
(2010) provides a model to analyze the trade implications of these costs.
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2 Incorporating distribution networks in discrete choice
models
Discrete choice models have become very popular to estimate substitution patterns between
di¤erentiated products. Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) showed how to estimate these
models with aggregate data on sales per product. Most work has focused on the role of
price and product characteristics, and some work also considered the impact of advertizing.
In this section we show how one may incorporate the role of distribution networks. For
clarity of exposition, we base the discussion on a simple logit model where consumers have
uncorrelated preferences for di¤erent products. In our empirical analysis we extend the
model to incorporate the possibility that consumers have correlated preferences for products
of the same segment and subsegment.
A total number of L potential consumers choose among J di¤erentiated products, j =
1; : : : ; J , or alternatively they may choose not to buy in which case they purchase the outside
good j = 0. The indirect utility of an individual i for product j is given by
ui;j = j + "i;j:
The rst part is the mean utility j, common to all consumers:
j  xj + pj + j:
This depends on a vector of observed product characteristics xj (such as horsepower), price
pj and an unobserved quality term j. The second part is the individual-specic deviation
around that mean "i;j, modelled as a mean zero random variable. In the simple logit model,
"i;j is distributed i.i.d. extreme value. This assumption implies that consumers substitute
symmetrically to other products when one product becomes less attractive.
Assuming that consumers choose the product j = 0; 1; : : : ; J that gives the highest utility,
one can obtain the individual choice probabilities or approximately the aggregate market
shares sj for every product j (where the market shares are sales divided by the potential
number of consumers L). Following Berry (1994), this gives rise to the following simple
demand system:
sj
s0
=
exp (j)
exp (0)
j = 1; : : : ; J;
where s0 = 1  
PJ
j=1 sj. Using the above denition of j for j = 1; : : : ; J and normalizing
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0 = 0 for the outside good, one obtains the estimating equation
ln sj=s0 = xj + pj + j: (1)
There are several ways to incorporate the role of distribution networks in this demand
framework. An obvious rst approach would simply consist of including the number of dealers
of the products brand, Nj, as an additional variable in the product characteristics vector xj.
In this case, consumers have a (mean) valuation for the number of dealers per se. While this
approach is attractive because of its simplicity, it entails some di¢ culties, such as the choice
of functional form in which Nj should enter. A practical di¢ culty also arises when the model
is estimated with pooled data over di¤erent countries to exploit cross-country variation, as
in our application. In this case, the number of dealers of a given brand may systematically
di¤er across countries because of di¤erences in market size or population density. An ad hoc
solution is to normalize the number of dealers per country, for example by dividing it by
the country average, Nj= N . We follow this as our rst approach to incorporate distribution
networks.
Our second and third approach incorporate the number of dealers in a di¤erent way,
giving rise to natural functional forms without requiring an arbitrary normalization of the
number of dealers. Our second approach explicitly starts from a more disaggregate choice
level. The consumers unit of choice is no longer the product (car model) j, but rather the
dealer k selling product j. Consumers may have correlated preferences for dealers k selling
the same product j according to a nested logit model. More specically, suppose that each
product j is sold by Nj dealers, so k = 1; : : : ; Nj. Individual is utility for dealer k selling
product j is given by
ui;kj = j + & i;j + (1  J)"i;kj:
This specication assumes that consumers have the same mean utility for all dealers of the
same product, kj = j. The individual-specic deviation around that mean is the sum of
two random variables "i;kj and & i;j, which follow the distributional assumptions of a nested
logit model (Cardell, 1997). First, "i;kj is an idiosyncratic valuation that is distributed i.i.d.
extreme value across products and dealers. Second, & i;j is a common valuation across all
dealers of product j, with the unique distribution such that & i;j + (1   J)"i;kj is also an
extreme value random variable. The parameter J , with 0  J  1, measures the degree
of preference correlation for dealers k selling the same product j. If J = 1, then dealers
selling the same product are perfect substitutes. In contrast, if J = 0, dealers of the same
product are equally di¤erentiated as dealers from di¤erent products (if they belong to the
same subgroup).
4
Following similar steps as in Berry (1994), the nested logit model gives rise to the following
inverted market share system
skj
s0

skj
sj
 J
=
exp (j)
exp (0)
; k = 1; : : : ; Nj; j = 1; : : : ; J
where skj is the market share of dealer k of product j, and sj =
PNj
k=1 skj is the market share
of product j. In contrast with Berry (1994), we do not observe market shares at the level
of the dealer (skj), but only at the level of the product (sj). However, since we assumed
kj = j, we can easily aggregate the market shares up to the level of the product j as in
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). After some rearrangements, this gives
sj
s0
= N1 Jj
exp (j)
exp (0)
:
Since 0 = 0, the estimating equation becomes
ln sj=s0 = xj + pj + (1  J) lnNj + j: (2)
This specication extends the base model in (1) with one additional variable, the log-
arithm of the number of dealers, lnNj. The coe¢ cient of this variable may be expected
to be between 0 and 1, and has the interpretation of preference correlation for dealers of
the same product. If consumers perceive dealers of a given product as perfect substitutes
(J = 1), the coe¢ cient of lnNj is 0. If consumers have uncorrelated preferences for dealers
of the same product (J = 0), the coe¢ cient is 1. Note that one can easily generalize this
approach to include nests at higher levels such as segments (as we do below) or to include
random coe¢ cients on continuous variables: in both cases, one simply uses standard models
and adds lnNj as an additional variable.
A third approach to incorporate the number of dealers starts from the assumption that
consumers value the distance to the nearest dealer. The total price for consumer i purchasing
product j is equal to the purchase price plus the expected travel cost to the nearest dealer,
pj+kd(Nj), where k is the travel cost per unit of distance and d(Nj) is the expected distance
of a consumer to the nearest dealer selling product j, a decreasing function of the number
of dealers in the country. If one assumes that consumer and dealer locations follow a spatial
Poisson process, then the expected distance to the nearest dealer follows a square root
lawin dealer density, d(Nj) = 0:5
p
M=Nj, where M is total surface area in the country.
Kolesar and Blum (1973) provide a derivation for this square root law, and Ferrari et al.
(2010) apply it to ATM demand. Replacing pj by pj + k0:5
p
M=Nj in (1), we obtain the
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following estimating equation:
ln sj=s0 = xj + pj + 

0:5
q
M=Nj

+ j; (3)
where  = k.
In practice, consumers and dealers may not be spread randomly across a region according
to a spatial Poisson distribution, so that the square root law does not hold. Ferrari et al.
(2010) assess this assumption for ATM locations, and they nd evidence that the square
root law is a good approximation for the expected distance to the nearest dealer in their
application. For our application on dealer locations, we used a Clarke-Evans test for complete
spatial randomness (based on the detailed dealer location data for Belgium, used in Nurski
and Verboven (2013)). The results from this test-statistic (not reported) show that for 28
of the 32 brands we cannot reject the hypothesis that the dealers are Poisson distributed.
There is dispersion for 3 brands (Opel, Peugeot and Volvo), while there is clustering for 1
brand (Subaru).
To summarize, we consider three approaches to incorporate the size of distribution net-
works. First, the characteristics approach simply includes the normalized number of dealers
Nj= N in the characteristics vector xj, and the coe¢ cient has the interpretation of a value for
the number of dealers per se. Second, the nested logit approach includes the logarithm of the
number of dealers lnNj. Its coe¢ cient captures the extent of preference correlation across
dealers of the same product. Third, the spatial Poisson approach includes the expected
distance to the nearest dealer 0:5
p
M=Nj. Its coe¢ cient reects the travel cost per unit of
distance. Note that there may still be other approaches to model the number of dealers. For
example, the number of dealers of a certain brand may a¤ect the likelihood that this brand
enters a consumers consideration set, similar to Goeree (2008)s approach to modeling the
impact of advertizing.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We combine two di¤erent datasets. Our rst dataset is from JATO, and contains information
on sales, list prices and product characteristics (such as horsepower and fuel economy) of all
cars sold during 2000-2009 in nine European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While the original data are
at the very detailed level of the model, engine variant and version (trim level), we aggregate
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the sales information to the model level (e.g. Golf), and select the base model to dene
the price and product characteristics. Each model can be assigned to a brand and a rm.
For example, the Golf and Passat are of the Volkswagen brand and the Ibiza is of the Seat
brand, and both of these brands belong to the VW Group. Each model can also be assigned
to one of seven possible marketing segments: subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard,
luxury, SUV and sports. Finally, each model can be assigned to a country of origin (as
perceived by consumers). For example, the Volkswagen brands are perceived as German and
the Seat brands as Spanish. Based on this information, we construct a dummy variable to
distinguish between domestic and foreign brands. For example, Volkswagen is a domestic
brand in Germany, and a foreign brand in the other eight countries of our dataset. For more
details on the data (for a shorter period up to 2006) we refer to Grigolon and Verboven
(2013).
Our second data set is from HWB (Harbour Wade Brown). It contains information on the
total number of dealers per brand, for the same period 2000-2009 in the same nine countries.
Dealers are dened as direct dealers, independent dealers and indirect agents. Almost all
dealers o¤er both sales and after-sales services. We combine the dealer data with the dataset
on sales, prices and product characteristics, using the variable brand as a common key.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the main variables. For example, the average sales of
a model in a market is 6113, with a large standard deviation of 14533. The average number
of dealers of a brand in a market is 418, again with a large standard deviation of 704. Note
that this large variation in the number of dealers is due to both between-brand variation
and within-brand variation (variation per brand across countries).2 Hence, we identify the
e¤ect of the number of dealers on sales from both between-brand variation and within-brand
variation.
3.2 Specication and estimation
We extend the above demand model to a two-level nested logit model. The upper level denes
the set of products in groups g according to the di¤erent marketing segments. The lower
level further divides each group in subgroups h of g, which refers to the country of origin:
domestic of foreign brand. We estimate the model for a panel of products (car models) j,
observed in di¤erent markets (country-year combinations) t. The nested logit gives rise to
the following estimating equation:
ln sjt=s0t = xjt + f(Njt) + pjt + HG ln sjjhgt + G ln shgjgt + j + t + jt; (4)
2For example, in 2005 the normalized number of dealers Nj= N had a mean of 0.97, an overall standard
deviation of 0.78, a between-brand standard deviation of 0.62 and a within-brand standard deviation of 0.56.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean St. Dev.
price/income 1.18 0.86
sales 6113.39 14533.12
horsepower (kW) 91.82 41.43
fuel cost (e/100km) 0.08 0.03
width 174.64 8.50
height 149.39 12.74
foreign 0.91 0.29
months available 9.74 2.59
dealers (Nj) 417.51 703.75
Nj= N 1.00 0.83
lnNj 5.35 1.09
0:5
p
M=Nj 0.50 0.26
Notes: The total number of observations (mod-
els/markets) is 18,021. The number of markets is 90
(9 countries during 2000-2009), the average number
of models per market is 200.
where sjt is the market share of product j in the potential market, s0t is the market share
of the outside good in the potential market,3 sjjhgt is the market share of the product in its
subgroup hg, and shjgt is the market share of the subgroup in the group g. The expression
f(Nj) is a measure of the number of dealers, i.e. Nj= N , lnNj or 0:5
p
M=Nj in our above
set-up. The nesting parameters H and G (with 0  G  HG  1) measure the degree of
preference correlation for products of the same subgroup and group. For example, if H = 1,
consumers perceive all brands of the same subgroup as perfect substitutes. As another
example, if H = G = 0, there is not preference correlation within subgroups and groups,
so the model simplies to a logit model. Note that our second approach to incorporate
distribution networks e¤ectively results in a three-level nested logit, implying the restriction
0  G  HG  J  1.
We account for a full-set of product xed e¤ects j, capturing time-invariant unobserved
quality for each car model. We also account for a full set of market xed e¤ects t, which
captures macro-economic shocks specic to every country and year. To estimate the model,
we adopt the common identication assumption that the product characteristics xjt are
exogenous, uncorrelated with the error term jt. We also assume that the number of dealers
Njt is uncorrelated with jt. While both xjt and Njt are chosen by the rms, we control for
time-invariant quality through j, so we only assume there is no correlation with unobserved
3The potential market is set equal to the total number of households.
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quality that changes over time or di¤ers across markets. In contrast, we allow price pjt and
the market share variables sjjhgt and shjgt to be endogenous. To account for their endogeneity
we follow Berry et al. (1995) and use sums of other product characteristics of the same rm
and of other rms as instruments. We also add sums of other product characteristics by
segment and subsegment as instruments.
3.3 Results
Table 2 shows the empirical results. The rst column shows the parameter estimates of
the nested logit model without accounting for the size of the dealer network. Price and
fuel cost have a signicant negative e¤ect on demand, while horsepower, width and height
have a signicant positive e¤ect. Consumers put a signicant negative valuation on brands
of foreign origin, showing the presence of a home bias. The nesting parameters satisfy
the restrictions for consistency with random utility maximization in a two-level nested logit,
0 < G = 0:53 <HG= 0:71 < 1. They indicate that there is strong segmentation according to
the marketing segments, and signicant further segmentation between domestic and foreign
brands.
The second to fourth columns show the results after controlling for the size of the dealer
network through each of our three measures. In all three cases the dealer variable enter
signicantly with the expected sign. The normalized number of dealers (Nj= N) has a positive
e¤ect, suggesting that consumers valuation dealer availability.4 The coe¢ cient for the log
number of dealers (lnNj) is also positive. Its magnitude is 0.24, so that J = 0:76, which
satisfying the restrictions 0 < G < HG < J < 1 of a three-level nested logit model.
Finally, the square root of surface area per dealer (0:5
p
M=Nj) has a negative coe¢ cient,
suggesting consumers put a negative valuation on brands with a higher expected travel cost.5
The dealer elasticity ranges between 0.2 and 0.5 across the three models, suggesting that a
1% increase in the number of dealers (i.e. an increase of 4.2 dealers on average) is associated
with an increase in market shares of 0.2% to 0.5% (or 12 to 31 extra cars sold per model).
Controlling for the size of the brandsdistribution networks leads to lower estimates of
the nesting parameters G and HG. This indicates that the extent of market segmentation
is overestimated in the model without dealer networks in column 1. More interestingly, after
4As a sensitivity check, we also estimated the dealer e¤ects interacted with a segment dummies. We found
that for most segments the dealer e¤ects do not di¤er signicantly from the average e¤ect of 0.197. The
exceptions are for the standard segment, with a stronger e¤ect of 0.309, and the SUV and sports segments,
with smaller e¤ects of respectively 0.060 and 0.135.
5Dividing the distance coe¢ cient by the price coe¢ cient (unnormalized for income) would imply a travel
cost of 106e per km. This includes the cost of all expected future service and repair trips, but it may also
capture non-transportation related factors omitted from this model.
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controlling for the size of the distribution networks, the negative valuation for brands of
foreign origin slightly drops (in absolute value), but it remains signicant and quantitatively
important. This suggests that distribution networks explain only part of the consumers
home bias (i.e. their preference for domestic over foreign brands), but it remains for an
important part unexplained. In sum, these ndings show that dealer networks are an impor-
tant factor contributing to the car producersmarket shares, but they only partly explain
much of the bias towards domestic brands.
Table 2: Nested Logit Demand Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
price/income -0.973 -0.801 -0.822 -0.935
(0.104) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103)
horsepower 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fuel cost -2.307 -4.750 -4.710 -4.392
(1.001) (1.028) (0.957) (0.868)
width 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
height 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
foreign -0.379 -0.343 -0.303 -0.313
(0.074) (0.064) (0.061) (0.066)
Nj= N 0.198
(0.026)
lnNj (J) 0.188
(0.037)
0:5
p
M=Nj () -0.266
-0.174
ln sjjhgt (HG) 0.655 0.460 0.557 0.693
(0.059) (0.066) (0.070) (0.061)
ln shgjgt (G) 0.528 0.352 0.450 0.564
(0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.061)
Notes: The total number of observations (models/markets)
is 18,021. Fixed e¤ects for products (car models) and mar-
kets (countries and years) are included. Standard errors
(clustered by model) are in parentheses.
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4 Conclusions
We have suggested various approaches to incorporate the role of distribution networks in
standard discrete choice models of product di¤erentation. Our empirical results give robust
conclusions across the di¤erent approaches. We obtain the following two main ndings.
First, distribution networks appear to be an important determinant of car producersmarket
shares. Second, distribution networks only explain part of the home bias, i.e. the larger
market shares of car producers in their home markets.
In sum, distribution networks matter for building market share advantages, but not nec-
essarily much to the advantage of the domestic producers. Having established the importance
of distribution networks, a next question is to what extent exclusive dealing plays a specic
role in deterring entry by new car producers from Asia or other countries. In ongoing re-
search, we explore this question in detail (Nurski and Verboven, 2013). We collected sales
data for Belgium at the level of the local market (town) and match these data to dealer loca-
tions (both single-brand and multi-brand dealers). We estimate a spatial demand model to
assess the entry-deterring incentive of exclusive dealing, when new entrants can compensate
incumbents and their dealers for not signing exclusive dealing contracts. We compare this
incentive with the e¢ ciency motivation for exclusive dealing (demand-enhancing because it
protects investments in sales and after-sales serivices), and compute the welfare e¤ects from
removing exclusive dealing.
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, American
Economic Review, June 1987, 77 (3), pp. 388401.
Arkolakis, Costas, Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in Inter-
national Trade,Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 118 (6), 11511199.
Ben-Akiva, Moshe E. and Steven R. Lerman, Discrete choice analysis: theory and
application to predict travel demand, Vol. 9, The MIT press, 1985.
Berger, Allen N. and Astrid A. Dick, Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover
Advantage,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, June 2007, 39 (4), 775807.
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, Automobile Prices in Market
Equilibrium,Econometrica, July 1995, 63 (4), 84190.
11
Berry, Steven T., Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Di¤erentiation,RAND
Journal of Economics, Summer 1994, 25 (2), 242262.
Bronnenberg, Bart J, Sanjay K Dhar, and Jean-Pierre H Dubé, Brand history,
geography, and the persistence of brand shares,Journal of political Economy, 2009, 117
(1), 87115.
Cardell, N Scott, Variance components structures for the extreme-value and logistic
distributions with application to models of heterogeneity,Econometric Theory, 1997, 13
(02), 185213.
Das, Sanghamitra, Mark J Roberts, and James R Tybout, Market entry costs,
producer heterogeneity, and export dynamics,Econometrica, 2007, 75 (3), 837873.
Ferrari, Stijn, Frank Verboven, and Hans Degryse, Investment and Usage of New
Technologies: Evidence from a Shared ATM Network,American Economic Review, June
2010, 100 (3), 104679.
Geroski, Paul. A., What do we know about entry?,International Journal of Industrial
Organization, December 1995, 13 (4), 421440.
Goeree, Michelle Sovinsky, Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal
Computer Industry,Econometrica, 09 2008, 76 (5), 10171074.
Grigolon, Laura and Frank Verboven, Nested Logit or Random Coe¢ cients Logit? A
Comparison of Alternative Discrete Choice Models of Product Di¤erentiation.,Review of
Economics and Statistics, 2013, forthcoming.
Kolesar, Peter and Edward H Blum, Square root laws for re engine response dis-
tances,Management Science, 1973, 19 (12), 13681378.
Nurski, Laura and Frank Verboven, Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence
from automobiles,2013. Mimeo.
Segal, Ilya R. and Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment,American
Economic Review, March 2000, 90 (1), 296309.
12
